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[jpten]

Now that these two craft are available I would just like to point out to any mission makers who are unaware, two points of usage on these crafts.

  Without radar and believing the next war would be a more static defensive battle, the French air doctrine of 1939-1940 ( Plan V) envisioned large numbers of standing patrols and ground observation sorties over the front lines.  Wishing to avoid the uncontrolled dogfights of WW1 the French also envisioned the radio as a preeminent tool to dominate aerial battles and had each fighter squadron equipped with a Potez 63.11 to carry the squadron leader (as observer, not pilot) to act as command aircraft, from which formations of single-seat fighters would be directed and co-ordinated by radio.  Some squadrons used the three seat Potez 631 if 63.11 were not available but any French fighter mission of this period should have the Squadron leader in a Potez (preferably a 63.11) instead of a single engine fighter.  Missions where the player is the squadron leader should like wise place the player in this type of craft.

  The actual play of history meant this concept was never as successful as envisioned but perhaps if the war had been less blitzkrieg it would have proven valuable.

  The detail on the Br.693 series is to note the rearward/downward firing MG (controlled by pilot) to suggest troop strafing missions.  While better suited to flying over trenches it would also work for road strafing.  Again the French was thinking of a more WW1 type of environment.

[SAS~Poltava]

Thanks for the info! New stuff for me!

[Gubi]

Indeed.  Thanx

[jeanba]

An interesting whatif, but this did not happen in  reality.
Moreover, they intended to use Potez 631 only. The concept being somewhat closer to awacs.
Potez63.11 was strictly a recon plane
The Breguet doctrine was "Vol Rasnt" or "Low altitude attack", it was not specidfically designed for trench attack.
It was used as intended : to try (unsuccessfully) to stop german advancing columns.

[Gubi]

I'm quite aware of the controversy's over the French handling of air doctrine's...and their equipment...but have never been entertained with a discussion, by knowledgeable individuals, on the subject.  It, actually, is one of the bemusing questions about 1940 really.  Please continue.  I mean it.  I'm interested in this discussion of they way the French were thinking of employing their Air Force. i.e.  Was there any concerted, organized, theme of an original bombing offensive...of any kind?  Cheers and prost

[jpten]

 According to The Forgotten Air Force: French Air Doctrine in the 1930s by Anthony Christopher Cain, the root problem of the Armee de la Air was a lack of understanding of the role of aviation to "turn the flank" from above.  The French Air Force had not separated from the Army till 1933.  Only being a separate force for 8 years, they were still tasking themselves with a "holding the line" mentality.  The Maginot line would hold the border with Germany. The lesser defense line along the Belgium border would give a springboard to advance and meet a German force advancing through the Belgium plains, expend the German attacking force and (if necessary) fall back to the border defenses which would be enough to hold the depleted German forces.  An Infantry thrust through the Ardennes would easily be contained by mobile reserves and the dense forest.  The French had started military build up two years after the British in 1938 and any changes to air doctrine was still in early development.
  The French felt the were militarily on par with Germany and had a superiority in resources.  Keep the battle on the border, strangle Germany with a sea blockade, chip away with bombing the Ruhr and hey would grow stronger each year while Germany grew weaker till they would be forced to surrender.